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Abstract 
The tendency for an individual to believe that a specific event, in hindsight, was more 
predictable than it was in foresight is known as hindsight bias. This phenomenon has 
been demonstrated in the psychological literature across a variety of samples, 
methodologies, and predictions for decades. The current study used a sample of 95 
mental health professionals to explore the impact of advanced outcome knowledge on the 
decision making process. Participants reviewed a hypothetical risk assessment in the form 
of a hospital chart and then responded to a series of questions, using only their clinical 
judgment. Analyses revealed that evaluators who were provided with outcome 
information regarding risk assessment evaluations were significantly more likely to 
indicate that they would have predicted the outcome than evaluators who were not 
provided with outcome information. Additionally, evaluators with advanced outcome 
knowledge endorsed higher ratings for risk of violence than those individuals who were 
not provided with outcome information on the evaluee’s risk assessment. Implications for 
forensic evaluation and legal decision making are discussed and  directions for future 
research presented.  
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 Hindsight Bias in Clinical Decision Making 
Forensic mental health professionals are frequently called upon to provide 
comprehensive and objective psychological evaluations with regard to a specific legal 
matter. These evaluators are considered by the court to be experts on the basis of their 
education, training, and experience and, because their judgment may impact the outcome 
of criminal and civil cases, they are professionally obligated to provide informed 
opinions to the best of their ability (Otto, 1989). In forensic evaluation, clinical judgment 
is a necessary component in developing opinions regarding the previous, current, and/or 
future behavior and cognitive functioning of an individual. The American Psychological 
Association (APA, 2013) set forth the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology 
(SGFP) to guide the activities of forensic practitioners to the benefit of the recipients of 
their services. SGFP guideline 1.02 states, “When conducting forensic examinations 
forensic practitioners strive to be unbiased and impartial, and avoid partisan presentation 
of unrepresentative, incomplete, or inaccurate evidence that might mislead finders of 
fact” (APA, 2013, p. 8). Thus, as the SGFP highlight, it is critical that evaluators remain 
vigilant of their potential for biases in order to prevent adverse effects on a forensic 
evaluation.  
Even with these guidelines in place, however, forensic evaluations may still be 
tainted by a variety of factors that have the potential to limit the accuracy and validity of 
the evaluator’s judgment. Some of these influencing factors include the presence of a 
third party during the evaluation, (e.g., an attorney or a family member; Cramer & 
Brodsky, 2007), cultural differences between the evaluator and individual being 
evaluated (Weiss & Rosenfeld, 2012), or issues pertaining to improper test administration 
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(Heilbrun, 1992). While it is important that evaluators give these factors appropriate 
consideration when conducting their evaluations, the most common human factors that 
arise are those related to the evaluator’s own subjective experiences and biases (Neal & 
Grisso, 2014). Over the past three decades, substantial maturation has occurred within the 
discipline of forensic psychology with respect to the (potential) impact of human factors 
in forensic decision making; however, extensive hurdles remain.  In 2010, Heilbrun and 
Brooks called for research on bias and human error to strengthen the field of forensic 
mental health assessment and to enhance the accuracy and objectivity required in forensic 
decision making.    
The existence and impact of various cognitive biases have been investigated in the 
medical (Arkes, 1981), legal (Stallard & Worthington, 1998), and social psychology 
(Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002) domains for decades. Similar to forensic psychology, these 
fields utilize various sources of information to critically analyze situations and to 
generate informed decisions (Neal & Brodsky, 2016). It is, therefore, not surprising that 
research has demonstrated that cognitive biases can also affect forensic mental health 
assessments (e.g., Boccaccini, Turner, & Murrie, 2008; Murrie, Boccaccini, Guarnera, & 
Rufino, 2013).  
Most typically, legal decision making takes place after some event has occurred. 
With respect to the issue of negligence, professionals are often tasked with evaluating the 
forseeability of a particular event; an evaluation that unequivocally take place ex post 
facto. Additionally, evaluators may be asked to assess the likelihood of an event that has 
already happened—such as suicide or a violent act—or asked to assess the 
appropriateness of professional practice considering these subsequent outcomes (Borum, 
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Otto, & Golding, 1993; LeBourgeois, Pinals, Williams, & Appelbaum, 2007). If the 
forensic evaluator opines that the appropriate level of care was not met in the initial 
evaluation, the initial evaluator may be subject to disciplinary actions or civil liability 
(LeBourgeois et al., 2007). These retrospective evaluations sustain considerable weight; 
therefore, it is critical that they are performed using methods to mitigate any potential 
bias. This is especially important in light of the well-known cognitive bias known as 
hindsight bias. Research has been demonstrated that people perceive and evaluate events 
differently, in hindsight, as a result of the tendency to overestimate what they could have 
known in foresight (Arkes & Harkness, 1980; Baron & Hersey, 1988; Fischhoff, 1975; 
Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff & Beyth 1975; Gilbertson, Dietrich, Olson, & Guenther, 
1994; LaBine & LaBine, 1996). In addition, when provided with information regarding 
the outcome of an event, individuals may simplify, trivialize, and retrospectively criticize 
the judgments that others have made without acknowledging the difficulty involved in the 
decision making process (LeBourgeois et al., 2007).  
Hindsight Bias 
Fischhoff (1975) created what is now known as the model paradigm for 
examining hindsight bias. By utilizing a hindsight group (individuals provided with 
knowledge regarding a specific outcome) and a foresight group (individuals not provided 
with knowledge regarding that same outcome) he assessed whether the receipt of 
advanced outcome information impacts an individual’s judgment. In addition, he 
examined the level of awareness that individuals have regarding the impact that the 
outcome knowledge had on their perception regarding a past event. Fischhoff opined that 
decision makers are unaware of the impact of outcome knowledge on the perceived 
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predictability of an event. Further, he demonstrated that information detailing the 
outcome of an event becomes assimilated into an evaluator’s decision making process, 
inevitably impacting the objectivity of the decision (Fischhoff, 1975).  
In some instances, evaluators with a great deal of experience on a certain topic 
might assume other individuals approach similar questions and situations with the same 
ease that they do, forgetting that they are especially proficient in the subject matter 
(Marks & Arkes, 2010). When an evaluator does not actively separate the proficiency of 
his or her knowledge in a particular area, he or she demonstrates source confusion, which 
is the inability to discriminate the different sources of information when evaluating a past 
event (e.g., what information came from the evaluation and what information came from 
knowledge he or she had known prior to reviewing the evaluation; Marks & Arkes, 
2010). It is imperative that experienced evaluators be aware of this and acknowledge their 
expertise as well as the fact that others may not be as experienced. In addition, evaluators 
with more experience may also be more familiar with the baserate for an event’s 
occurrence; thus, if the occurrence of a specific event is rare, those with more experience 
may be less likely to make judgments suggestive of hindsight bias when compared to 
novice evaluators (Dawson et al., 1988). Research regarding the impact that an 
individual’s experience in a given subject area has on the potential for hindsight bias, 
however, is mixed. Some studies indicate that expertise in a subject area can mitigate the 
impact of hindsight bias where other studies suggest that expertise does not make a 
difference (for review see; Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, 
Brockway, & Prosavac, 2004). 
Additional research on hindsight bias has suggested that evaluators take outcome 
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knowledge and provide more weight to information from the event that supports that 
outcome, rather than independently formulating their own opinion surrounding the event 
(Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981). In this scenario, evaluators essentially 
disregard other relevant information that may have led to alternate opinions. This 
suggests that the decision-making process may not have been as thorough as it could have 
been had all the information been scrutinized equally and other outcomes considered.  
Hindsight bias is well-established in the psychological literature. Since 
Fischhoff’s seminal research, meta-analyses have shown a significant effect across 
various predictions, subjects, and methodologies (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 
1991; Guilbault et al., 2004). Hindsight bias is robust, difficult to reduce, and has 
appealed to researchers with a wide range of interests (Pezzo, 2011) such as medical 
professionals (Arkes & Harkness, 1980), psychiatrists (LeBourgeois et al., 2007), 
historians (Dymkowski, Domin, Marszałek, & Pałasiński, 2007), accountants (Jennings, 
Lowe, & Reckers, 1998) and, more recently, judges (Oeberst & Goeckenjan, 2016). In 
addition, a number of studies have examined this form of bias within the legal context, 
including felony murder (Evelo & Green, 2013), warrantless police searches (Casper, 
Benedict, & Perry, 1989), and civil liability decisions (LaBine & LaBine, 1996).  
When evaluating a past event, individuals tend to overestimate their ability to 
predict the outcome of that event (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988). The inability 
to separate hindsight and foresight knowledge when providing an expert opinion may 
become an issue among forensic mental health evaluators. LeBourgeois et al., (2007) 
examined hindsight bias utilizing a sample of 235 general and forensic psychiatrists. 
Findings reflected that those who were provided with outcome information regarding an 
HINDSIGHT BIAS IN CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
   
9 
evaluee’s risk assessment endorsed significantly higher risk ratings than those who were 
not provided outcome information. However, when examining the impact this 
information had on negligence determination, the difference between groups was non-
significant. Further, LeBourgeois and colleagues (2007) explored the responses of 
general psychiatrists in comparison to forensic psychiatrists. Results suggested that 
forensic psychiatrists were less prone to this form of bias, as the mean difference in risk 
ratings between those provided additional outcome information and those who were not 
was smaller in the forensic psychiatrist sample as compared to the general psychiatrist 
sample. These researchers postulated that this might be due to the nature of forensic 
work, as it is frequently scrutinized by courtroom personal (i.e., judges, jurors, attorneys) 
and that forensically oriented psychiatrists may use standardized assessments for 
evaluating risk, essentially mitigating this form of bias.  
Current Study 
The current study sought to examine the postulations by LeBourgeois et al., 
(2007), which suggested that forensic mental health professionals may be less susceptible 
to hindsight bias when conducting retrospective evaluations, due to involvement in 
ongoing education and research as well as the ethical practice of forensics. A sample of 
forensic mental health professionals was used to further explore whether advanced 
outcome knowledge impacts the decision making process causing hindsight bias-like 
effects in retrospective risk assessments. As forensic mental health evaluations are 
supposed to be bias-free, further examination of the issue of hindsight bias utilizing a 
diverse sample of forensic mental health professionals will allow for further delineation 
of the potential impact of outcome knowledge on these evaluations. Based on the 
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growing empirical literature, it was hypothesized that those professionals who were 
provided with information regarding the outcome of the risk assessment would endorse 
higher risk assessment ratings—and be more likely to report that they would have 
predicted the outcome—in comparison to those professionals who were unaware of the 
outcome. Further, as LeBourgeois et al., (2007) found that psychiatrists determinations of 
negligence were not impacted by outcome information, regardless of if they were general 
or forensic practitioners, it was hypothesized that in the current study receipt of advanced 
outcome information would not impact the professional’s determination of negligence.  
Methods 
Participants 
Data were collected between June 2015 and November 2016 from forensic mental 
health evaluators attending one of three different in-person training workshops in areas 
relevant to forensic evaluation. Participants were 95 forensic mental health professionals 
(34 males (36%); 61 females (64%)) who ranged in age from 21 to 75 years (M = 
41.37, SD = 14.13). Most participants (47%) reported some form of doctoral degree as 
their highest level of education (PhD: 30%, n = 28; PsyD: 17%, n = 16) and an average of 
13 years (SD = 11.26) in their current profession. Participants’ experience conducting 
forensic evaluation ranged from 0-37 years (M = 8.58, SD = 9.82).  
Materials 
 Demographics. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire that 
encompassed a breadth of questions relevant to various Forensic Mental Health 
Assessments (Appendix A). Questions assessed evaluators’ attitudes and experiences 
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regarding a range of topics, but only information relevant to this study was included in 
the analyses. 
Risk assessment case material. Participants were provided with information 
consisting of a brief overview of an individual’s risk assessment (either risk for homicide 
or risk for suicide) in the form of a hospital chart. The stimulus materials used in the 
current study were the same materials used by LeBourgeois and colleagues in 2007. 
LeBourgeois et al. (2007) indicated that their materials were kept concise (i.e., under 750 
words) to encourage participants’ completion and noted that the hypothetical cases had 
been circulated to 11 psychiatrists for feedback to ensure the cases were representative of 
an actual risk assessment evaluation. 
All information within the actual case (i.e., history of present illness, mental 
health, medical, psychosocial and family history, mental status exam, additional 
information, final assessment, and plan) was identical for both the hindsight and foresight 
groups, with the exception that the hindsight groups received one sentence of additional 
information regarding the outcome of the evaluee’s risk assessment (e.g., Two days after 
the psychologist in the emergency room assessed him, the patient committed suicide by 
shooting himself with a gun; see Appendix B).  
Risk assessment questionnaire. The questionnaire was modeled off the 
Lebourgeois et al., (2007) and Labine and Labine (2006) studies, which both examined 
hindsight bias effects in risk assessment evaluations and negligence determinations. 
Questions were designed to garner the clinician’s assessment of the evaluee’s risk for 
violence (i.e., homicide or suicide) at the time he was released from the hospital using a 7 
point Likert-type scale (1 = low risk, 4 = moderate risk, 7 = high risk), as well as a closed 
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ended question asking, “What would you have predicted the outcome of this incident was 
likely to be?” (e.g., patient would commit suicide or patient would not commit suicide). 
Participants were also provided the opportunity to indicate three to four reasons for their 
prediction.  
Subsequent questions were designed to assess participants’ opinions regarding the 
initial evaluator’s risk assessment. Participants were asked the degree to which they 
believed the initial assessment was negligent on a 7 point Likert scale (1 = not negligent, 
4 = moderately negligent, 7 = very negligent). A closed-ended question also asked, “If 
you had to make a final decision about the negligence of this psychologist, what would 
you decide?” (i.e., this psychologist was not negligent in performing his/her professional 
duty or this psychologist was negligent in performing his/her professional duty; see 
Appendix C). 
Procedure 
This study was part of a larger project exploring issues relevant to forensic 
evaluations such as bias awareness, inter-rater reliability of forensic assessment tools, and 
cultural differences.  Data were collected at a series of training workshops attended by 
forensic mental health professionals between June 2015 and November 2016. A 2 
(homicide risk v. suicide risk) x 2 (hindsight-received outcome information v. foresight-
no outcome information) between-groups design was used. Each participant received a 
research packet containing the stimulus materials, demographic questionnaire, and two 
copies of the informed consent form. Stimulus materials were randomized to ensure that 
each participant received one of the four conditions: (a) suicide foresight group, (b) 
suicide hindsight group, (c) homicide foresight group, and (d) homicide hindsight group. 
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Participants were told about the research and were asked to complete the informed 
consent, retaining a copy for their own records, and the research materials. Participation 
was voluntary and all participants were assured that the decision whether to participate or 
not would in no way impact the training they would receive at the workshops. All 
materials and procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board at the City 
University of New York.  
Data Analysis 
Between-group comparisons on demographic variables were conducted using 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Tukey’s post-hoc test for continuous variables and 
chi-square analyses for categorical variables. Questions concerning risk assessment were 
subject to a series of ANOVAs, chi-squares, and logistic regressions to analyze whether 
responses differed between hindsight and foresight groups. Questions concerning 
negligence were subject to a series of ANOVA and chi-square analyses.  
Results 
Demographic Variables 
No significant main effects were found between the three sub-samples when 
comparing demographic variables based on data collection period (see Table 1). Thus, the 
groups were collapsed and analyzed as a single sample. No significant main effects were 
found between hindsight and foresight groups or between suicide and homicide groups 
for any of the demographic variables (see Table 2). As research surrounding expertise 
and hindsight bias has mixed results Tukey’s post-hoc analyses was conducted to see if 
years’ experience conducting forensic evaluations differed as this would allow for further 
analyses exploring this relation and adding to the literature. Tukey’s post-hoc analyses, 
however, indicated that the suicide foresight group (M = 12.57 years, SD = 11.42) 
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reported conducting forensic evaluations significantly longer than the suicide hindsight 
group (M = 4.37 years, 4.71; F (3, 74) = 2.486, p = .043, 95% CI [.171, 16.242]).  
Risk Ratings  
Participant responses were analyzed to identify whether ratings of risk differed by 
type of risk assessment. Comparisons between suicide and homicide conditions revealed 
no significant main effects, F(1,87) = .999, p = .320, ηp
2 = .011, 95% CI [-.264, .797], or 
interaction effects, F(1,87) = 1.47, p = .229, ηp
2 = .017, 95% CI [-1.707, .414] Thus, the 
suicide and homicide groups were collapsed for the remainder of the risk rating analyses.  
Opinions regarding Risk    
Participants were asked to provide risk ratings that were both continuous (on a 7-
point Likert-type scale) and categorical (would/would not commit suicide/homicide). 
Comparisons between hindsight and foresight groups with respect to continuous opinions 
regarding risk showed a significant main effect for outcome knowledge, F(1,87) = 
11.343, p = .001, ηp
2 = .115 Mdiff =  -.898, 95% CI [ -1.429, -.368] such that participants 
who were provided with outcome information gave significantly higher violence risk 
ratings (M = 4.78, SD = 1.15) than those who were not provided with outcome 
information (M = 3.85, SD = 1.38; see Figure 1). Participants’ risk ratings on the Likert-
type scale significantly predicted their categorical responses regarding risk, b = 1.501, 
Wald = 17.417,  p < .001,  OR = 4.48, 95%  CI [2.22,9.07]), such that for every 1.5 point 
increase on the scale participants were 4.48 times more likely to endorse a categorical 
response suggesting they would have predicted the violent act based on the information 
provided. In comparison to their foresight counterparts, participants who were provided 
with outcome information were significantly more likely to report that they would have 
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predicted a violent outcome at the initial evaluation, χ2 (1) = 7.453, p = .006 ; Φ = .286 
95% CI [.94, 469].  
Experience and Risk Ratings 
As a significant difference was found between the suicide hindsight and foresight 
groups with respect to years of experience conducting forensic evaluations, exploratory 
analyses were run to investigate whether experience predicted participants’ decisions 
regarding risk. Years of experience was not a significant predictor of risk ratings, r2 = 
.009, F(1, 72) = .654, p = .421, 95% CI [4.079, 4.975], regardless of whether or not 
participants received outcome information. 
Negligence Ratings  
Participant responses were analyzed to determine whether opinions regarding 
negligence significantly differed by type of risk assessment. Comparisons between 
suicide and homicide conditions revealed no significant main effects, F(1,85) = .216, p = 
.643, ηp
2 = .003, 95% CI [-.803, .498] or interaction effects, F(1,85) = 1.13, p = .291, ηp
2 
= .013, 95% CI [-1.996, .605]. Thus, the suicide and homicide groups were collapsed for 
the remainder of the negligence opinion analyses. 
Opinions regarding Negligence   
No significant differences were found between hindsight and foresight groups 
with respect to opinions regarding negligence, measured either continuously, F(1,85) = 
.216, p = .643, ηp
2 = .003, 95% CI [-.803, .498], or categorically, χ2 (1) = 1.44, p = .229 ; 
Φ = .103, 95% CI [.008, .315] (see Figure 2). Participants’ responses were split equally 
between determinations of negligence, with half the participants indicating they believed 
the initial evaluator was negligent. The highest frequency of “negligent” opinions (i.e., 
HINDSIGHT BIAS IN CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
   
16 
that the initial evaluator was negligent) was found amongst those participants who had 
received outcome information. 
Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to extend the current body of literature on forensic 
mental health assessment by examining the impact of outcome information on forensic 
evaluators’ ex post facto opinions/predictions regarding risk. Results demonstrate the 
presence of hindsight bias when evaluators are provided with outcome information and 
asked to formulate opinions regarding a previously-conducted risk assessment. That is, 
evaluators who were provided with information regarding event outcomes (i.e., were 
informed that the evaluee went on to committee a violent act) provided significantly 
higher violence risk ratings and were more likely to suggest that they would have 
predicted a violent outcome than those who were not provided with outcome information. 
These findings support the primary hypothesis that evaluators who are provided with 
information regarding the outcome of an event will provide opinions indicative of 
hindsight bias, potentially resulting in a lack of objectivity in the evaluation process. 
The results of this study are consistent with previous research on hindsight bias, 
which has demonstrated that when individuals are provided with outcome information 
regarding a specific event, their judgment of that event is impacted as they believe the 
outcome of the event was highly foreseeable (Arkes et al., 1988; Arkes et al., 1981; 
Baron & Hershey, 1988; Fischhoff 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Labine & Labine, 
1996; Lebourgeois et al., 2007). The results of the current study highlight the biasing 
effect that advanced outcome knowledge has on forensic mental health evaluators’ expert 
opinions regarding ex post facto predictions of risk. Participants did not appear to 
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appreciate the difficulty of the initial decision making process, as their responses 
indicated that they would have known the outcome of the evaluation based on the initial 
assessment. Thus, their evaluation of and decision making process regarding the initial 
event, in hindsight, do not meet the objective standard to which forensic examinations 
aspire.  
It is essential to the overall neutrality and objectivity of the assessment process 
that evaluator decisions are as objective and accurate as possible. Currently, although 
several guidelines are in place, there is no judicial determination that establishes 
minimally acceptable standards of professional conduct for forensic evaluations 
(Heilburn, DeMatteo, Marczyk, & Goldstein, 2008) and, depending upon the jurisdiction, 
the credentials required for being considered an expert evaluator may be lax (Frost, de 
Camara, & Earl, 2006). The field of forensic psychology has evolved to where it is 
considered a best practice to acknowledge the limitations in forensic evaluation: Being 
aware of issues of bias and taking steps to mitigate the impact of bias are important first 
steps.  
If forensic evaluators overestimate their ability to predict outcomes and 
underestimate the difficulty of the decision making process, they may misestimate the 
causal role of the actions, or omissions, of a previous evaluator (LeBourgeois et al., 
2007). It is reassuring, to some extent, that responses regarding the initial evaluator’s 
potential negligence were not impacted when participants in our study were provided 
with outcome information. These results mirror Lebourgeois et al’s. (2007) results and 
help to delineate the types of decisions (assessments and evaluations) for which the 
inclusion of additional outcome information might have an impact.  
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Although ratings of negligence did not differ between the hindsight and foresight 
groups, the findings from this study have vast implications for the field of forensic 
psychology. Risk ratings in this study showed marked differences between the two 
groups, demonstrating, again, that advanced outcome knowledge has the ability to hinder 
the objectivity of the evaluation process and lead to biased opinions/testimony by mental 
health evaluators (Labine & Labine, 1996). Objective assessments—wherein evaluators 
are required to maintain an impartial stance and provide evaluations that are free from 
bias—are necessary to ensure that criminal justice proceedings are fair and the rights of 
defendants are protected. Forensic evaluators are considered experts by the courts and, as 
such, are required to provide impartial opinions to assist the trier of fact in making a legal 
decision. It is presumed that forensic mental health evaluators will only consider 
information germane to the legal issue being evaluated; however, when outcome 
information is provided and assimilated into an evaluator’s decision making process, 
without measures in place to limit the impact of irrelevant contextual, this is no longer the 
case and the opinion of the evaluator becomes, potentially, less dependable. For example, 
an evaluator who formulated an opinion of risk that was based only on relevant case 
information provides a more reliable opinion for the court, as that evaluator’s decision 
was not tainted by knowledge of the outcome that was unknown to the initial evaluator.  
A related issue for retrospective evaluations wherein the evaluator is aware of the 
outcome is that the evaluator comes to believe that he or she would have known the 
outcome all along; in essence, demonstrating that evaluators are unable to tease apart the 
impact of various pieces of data (information) on their decision making process, Just as it 
‘is impossible to unring a bell’, evaluators are unable to discount the impact of irrelevant 
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information on their decisions/opinions. The result of this is an exaggerated level of 
confidence in one’s decision making ability (Arkes, 1981; Arkes et al., 1981; Koriat, 
Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). Evaluators may believe that they are better decision 
makers than they actually are and overestimate their ability to predict outcomes of similar 
events in the future, all without realizing the impact of the additional (irrelevant) 
information on their decision making process (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975).  This 
overconfidence in decision making can lead to premature conclusions and a lack of 
sufficient consideration of alternative possibilities, ultimately decreasing the accuracy of 
future judgments. This undue level of confidence might result in a lack of further 
development of one’s decision making skills (e.g., “I’m good at what I do, I don't need 
any further training or professional development”).  
Research has suggested that the more a person knows about a topic, the less likely 
it is that learning the outcome will lead to considerable change in the decision making 
process (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991). In the current study years experience 
was not a predictor of participants’ response regarding risk for violence regardless if the 
participant is given outcome information or not suggesting otherwise. These results add 
to the mounting evidence suggesting that hindsight bias can compromise legal decision 
maker’s ability to make fair and unbiased decisions (Casper et al., 1989; Evelo & Green, 
2013; Labine & Labine, 2006; LeBourgeois et al., 2007) 
Qualitative Responses 
Exploration of participants’ qualitative responses indicated interesting differences 
between participants who predicted violence and those who did not. Those participants 
who predicted a non-violent outcome selected protective factors that supported this 
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opinion (e.g., low base rate, evaluee’s son, medication compliant); however, those who 
predicted a violent outcome referenced risk factors in support of this opinion (e.g., 
specific victim, poor self-care, social withdrawal and feelings of hopelessness). Although 
participants were all given the same case information, qualitative responses regarding 
reasons for their opinions indicated that participants selected pieces of data in support of 
their decision. That is, participants highlighted protective factors in support of opinions of 
low risk (non-violent outcomes) whereas risk factors were highlighted for opinions of 
high risk (violent outcomes). Contextual information regarding the outcome of the event 
might have served as an anchor, causing participants to search for data consistent with 
this outcome.  
In formulating an opinion, forensic evaluators must consider a series of data 
points (observations), which form the basis for their conclusion. Participants’ qualitative 
responses were further examined to see whether two evaluators given the exact same 
information (the same observations; i.e., the same case information), with the exception 
that one of them received an additional piece of data (irrelevant contextual information 
regarding outcome), would give equal weight to the same data. Some participants who 
were given outcome information selected a particular piece of data (information) as a 
reason for why they believed they would have predicted the violent act whereas 
participants who were not given outcome information used that same piece of data as a 
reason for why they would not have predicted the violent act. For example, one 
participant who was provided with the outcome of the homicide evaluation indicated that 
he (or she) would have predicted the act of homicide because the evaluee had “numerous 
thoughts of killing, including past thoughts.” However, another participant who was not 
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informed of the outcome indicated that she (or he) would not have predicted the violent 
act because the evaluee had “no history of violence even when he thought about hurting 
someone prior.” In addition, one participant provided with the outcome of the suicide 
evaluation indicated he (or she) would have predicted a suicide outcome because the 
evaluee “had a desire for hospitalization” whereas a participant who did not receive 
outcome information opined that she (or he) would not have predicted the outcome 
because “the patient came to the ER for help.” These examples illustrate how the same 
information can be used as the basis for two opposing opinions, and how contextual 
information can impact the interpretation of the various data points (observations) that 
forensic evaluators must consider when formulating their opinions. These examples 
demonstrate how two forensic evaluators given the same information can arrive at 
different conclusions and how poor reliability between evaluators can impact ex post 
facto predictions of risk. In the current study participants relied solely upon their clinical 
judgment to make decisions; however, even with actuarial measures—which are thought 
to be objective and to reduce or eliminate discretion or subjectivity in scoring the items—
research has shown that expert reliability is poor and subject to bias (Murrie et al., 2013). 
It would be beneficial for the field to create standardize procedures that may help in 
mitigating the impact of additional contextual information on the way information is 
processed in forensic evaluation. This study, as well as others, demonstrates the impact of 
irrelevant information (i.e., outcome information, retaining party) in leading to different 
(i.e., unreliable) conclusions between individuals.  
Limitations  
Caution with the generalizability of these results is warranted as participants were 
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not randomly selected. Rather, these professionals sought out training in areas related to 
forensic psychology. Evaluators who seek out training opportunities may be 
characteristically different from those who do not, thus it is possible that the evaluators in 
this study were more motivated to obtain training and perhaps were more knowledgeable 
about, and/or less susceptible to, biases in their own work. Further, these professionals 
might have obtained previous training on clinical decision making or techniques to 
mitigate the impact of bias, further enabling them to minimize bias in the responses they 
provided. Even though participants in this study displayed a wide range of forensic 
experience, geographic location, and varying educational degrees, replicating this study 
with a random sample of forensic mental health participants might lead to more 
generalizable findings as a result of stronger external validity.  
Another limitation is that participants were provided a limited amount of 
information on the evaluee and the risk assessment. The case material used was not 
nearly as rich and comprehensive as it would have been in practice. In addition, there was 
no mention in any of the case material about whether the initial evaluator inquired about 
the evaluee’s access to weapons. Because most of the participants in this study found the 
evaluator negligent, regardless of receiving outcome information or not, it is plausible 
that the lack of information regarding weapons might have impacted the results regarding 
negligence. It could be the case that participants in this study who were informed of the 
outcome yet stated that they would not have predicted the outcome from the initial 
evaluation, still opined that the initial evaluator was negligent due to this lack of 
information. Determinations surrounding negligence may have been different if 
information regarding access to a weapon had been provided.  
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Future Research  
These results have implications for retrospective evaluations of an individual’s 
risk. Future research should examine hindsight bias in other types of evaluations and 
assessments (e.g., diagnostic evaluations, competency to stand trial evaluations, custody 
evaluations). Understanding the nuances regarding the types of evaluations and the 
circumstances under which this type of bias can occur will assist in creating and 
implementing standardized assessment procedures to minimize or mitigate the impact of 
biasing information in forensic evaluation.    
Counterfactual reasoning, or “considering-the-opposite,” has been demonstrated 
as a technique to minimize the effects of hindsight bias in decision making (Koriat et al., 
1980; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984; Slovic, & Fischhoff, 1977). Being aware of the 
impact that this bias has on the decision making process, as well as being instructed to 
ignore the known outcome when evaluating a situation that has already occurred, has 
been shown to be a “useless technique” to diminish the impact of this form of bias 
(Fischhoff, 1975). By considering the opposite the evaluator is encouraged to think 
through all possible outcomes and to review all reasons why an event might have 
occurred. It is hoped that by thinking through all possible outcomes an evaluator may 
convey a level of confidence in their decision that would appropriately reflect the 
thorough process they utilized to make that decision. As it has been demonstrated that 
outcome information impacts forensic mental health professionals’ retrospective 
assessments of risk, future research should examine the impact of considering the 
opposite or other bias-mitigation techniques on decision making regarding retrospective 
risk assessments.  
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Linear sequential unmasking is a context management technique that has been 
highlighted in the forensic sciences as a means of reducing the impact of irrelevant 
information on the decision making process (Dror et al., 2015). Linear sequential 
unmasking delineates limits and restrictions on when various pieces of data are provided 
to evaluators with the goal of  providing only that information which is relevant to the 
referral question. In the current study, evaluators were informed of the outcome prior to 
reading the case materials and prior to being given an opportunity to formulate their own 
conclusions. Providing forensic evaluators with case materials without biasing outcome 
information and only providing outcome information (or other irrelevant contextual 
information) after an evaluator has made an initial formulation of risk might assist 
forensic evaluators in attaining impartial and objective evaluations—standards to which 
their evaluations are held. 
Conclusion 
This study demonstrated that advanced outcome knowledge has the ability to 
affect an evaluator’s objectivity in the decision making process. When evaluators were 
informed of the outcome of an individual’s risk assessment, they believed the outcome to 
have been foreseeable and provided responses suggesting that they would have predicted 
the outcome during the initial evaluation. Additionally, evaluators selected details from 
the case report that corroborated their opinions, suggesting that they did not take into 
consideration the level of difficulty required to make the initial evaluation decision.  
Context can impact the way we process information. Biases are implicit and can 
impact an evaluation without the evaluator’s awareness. By understanding and 
recognizing biases, evaluators can achieve a better quality of work. Without 
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acknowledging biases, it is plausible that evaluators will not take further steps to mitigate 
it. When hindsight bias impacts the evaluation process, the validity of the evaluator’s 
opinion may ultimately be called into question. The lack of objectivity in the decision 
making process can negatively impact the creditability of the opinion provided, the 
evaluator, and the field of forensic psychology. Results from the current study emphasize 
the need for forensic evaluators to remain vigilant of how hindsight bias can negatively 
impact evaluations, as well as how the field of forensic psychology must work towards 
implementing de-biasing techniques.  
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Appendix A: Demographic Survey 
Please answer the following questions regarding your background and experience 
conducting forensic evaluations.  You will be asked to provide numbers or percentages 
below that you may not necessarily have absolute values for; please do your best to 
estimate where applicable. 
 
Age: _______    
Gender: Male _____   Female _____ 
Country of Residence:   ________________________________ 
 If United States, which state?: ____________________ 
 
Please indicate your profession: 
_______ Psychology 
_______ Psychiatry 
_______ Social Work 
_______ Other (please specify) ________________________________________ 
 
Highest degree(s) and year(s) received: ________________________________ 
 
Indicate the specialty track of your highest degree: 
Clinical      ____   Neuropsychology ____ Industrial/Organizational ____ 
Counseling ____ Geriatric               ____ Health/Rehabilitation       ____ 
Forensic     ____ Other (please specify) ____________________ _________ 
 
 
Which of the following describes your training in forensic psychology? (indicate all 
that apply) 
_______ Formal postdoctoral fellowship in forensic psychology or psychiatry 
_______ Medical degree in psychiatry followed by continuing education in forensic  
    evaluation 
_______ Doctoral degree in psychology (i.e., clinical, counseling) followed by  
    continuing education in forensic evaluation 
_______ Doctoral degree in forensic psychology 
_______ Master’s degree in forensic psychology 
_______ Master’s degree in psychology (i.e., clinical, counseling) followed by  
   continuing education in forensic evaluation 
_______ Other (please specify) ______________________________________________ 
 
Are you licensed to practice psychology? Yes____ No_____  
Year of first licensure in psychology:  _______________ 
Number of years post-doctoral practicing: ____________     
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State(s) or Country in which you practice: ________________________________  
Which professional organizations related to your work are you a member, affiliate, 
fellow, etc. for? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please indicate the number of years of experience in your current profession: _____ 
 
Please indicate the number of years of experience in forensic evaluation: _____ 
 
Please indicate the number of years of experience working with forensic 
populations: ____ 
Approximately how many forensic evaluations have you performed over the course 
of your career?  ______ 
 
Approximately how many forensic evaluations did you perform in 2015? ______ 
 
Which best describes your experience performing forensic evaluations of any kind 
(e.g., trial competence/fitness, legal sanity/criminal responsibility, violence risk, 
child custody)? 
_______ I have not had any training in forensic evaluation, and I have never conducted  
                an evaluation independently 
_______ I have training in forensic evaluation, but have never conducted an evaluation 
     independently 
_______ I have conducted 1-5 forensic evaluations independently 
_______ I have conducted 6-20 forensic evaluations independently 
_______ I have conducted 21-100 forensic evaluations independently 
_______ I have conducted more than 100 forensic evaluations independently 
 
Approximately how many times per year do you testify in court about your 
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Appendix B: Case Studies  
 
Homicide Risk Assessment Practice Survey 
 
--- Case Background --- 
A patient presented to a hospital emergency room with a chief complaint of homicidal 
ideation. He was released with directions to follow-up with his outpatient psychiatrist.  
 
Below is a reproduction of the hospital chart with the note that the evaluating 
psychologist wrote after assessing the patient. Please review the case and answer the 
questions that follow the case. 
 
BEGINNING OF HOSPITAL ER CONTACT SUMMARY 
 
--- Chief Complaint --- 
“I’m feeling worse.” “I’m having homicidal thoughts of killing my ex-wife and friend.”  
 
--- History of Present Illness --- 
Mr. Davis is a 34-year-old Caucasian man who arrived alone at the ER at 10:30PM. He 
reported feeling depressed for the last three months but “started getting worse” in the last 
week. He has been having thoughts about “shoot and kill his ex-wife and friend.” He 
reported that recently she has taken their young child and left him. He reported he was 
convinced she left him for his friend and that she had been “sleeping around” prior to 
their divorce. He has felt slowed down, has had difficulty concentrating, and has lost ten 
pounds over the last three months. He took a few days off of work last week because he 
“can’t get out of bed in the morning.”   
 
He first saw a psychiatrist ten days ago, and he was prescribed Zoloft 50mg. Mr. Davis 
says he has been taking the medicine regularly. He said he has been feeling more anxious 
and having more difficulty sleeping than before taking Zoloft and “thought about 
stopping it.” He said he attempted to contact his psychiatrist, but since it is the weekend, 
he has been unable to contact her at her office number. 
--- Mental Health History --- 
He reported thinking about homicide on one prior occasion at the age of 25 after a 
breakup with a girlfriend, but he did not make an attempt. Has never sought treatment for 
depression until ten days ago.  He drinks “two glasses of wine at dinner once a week.” He 
denied illicit drug use. 
 
--- Medical History --- 
No major medical conditions.  
 
--- Psychosocial History --- 
Employed as a salesman. Divorced 6 months ago. Has a 3-year-old son who lives with 
his ex-wife in a neighboring state. Not currently in a relationship. Has family in the city 
and is close with one brother who lives in the city. Has few friends from work with whom 
he usually socializes, but not lately.  
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--- Family History --- 
Father is an “alcoholic” 
Sister takes Paxil for “stress” 
No family history of suicides or psychiatric hospitalizations 
 
--- History of Violence --- 
Mr. Davis has no known history of violence.  
 
--- Mental Status Exam --- 
Appearance- looks like he hasn't saved in several days 
Behavior- mild psychomotor agitation (fidget, can’t sit still) 
Mood- “depressed,” “nervous” 
Affect- congruent with self-report 
Speech- slow rate 
Thought process- linear 
Thought content- (+) homicidal ideation, and thoughts of “killing my ex-wife and friend.” 
He said, “I would never do it because I want her to be here for my son” 
No suicidal ideation 
No delusions were endorsed 
Perceptions- no auditory or visual hallucinations 
Cognition- no objective impairment 
Insight- good (he knows he is depressed and seeks treatment) 
 
--- Additional Information --- 
I was able to contact Mr. Davis’ current psychiatrist. She said that Mr. Davis was 
scheduled for another appointment in three weeks; but that she has an opening in her 
schedule and he could come to her office in one week for an earlier appointment if 
needed. She indicated she would write and call in a prescription for Clonazepam 0.5mg 
po bid, 30 pills, no refill for symptoms potentially resulting from Zoloft side effects.  
 
--- Assessment --- 
1. Major Depression, recurrent, moderate severity 
2. Adjustment issues (divorce) 
3. Increased anxiety/insomnia since starting Zoloft is likely an early side-effect of Zoloft, 
per treating MD 
4. Although Mr. Davis was initially interested in hospitalization, when I explained that his 
anxiety was likely a side-effect of Zoloft that could improve with time and a brief course 
of an additional medication, he endorsed feeling hopeful and said he would rather go 
home. 
 
--- Plan --- 
1. Pt indicated he would continue to take anti-depressant medication as prescribed, and 
he would immediately pick up and start taking Clonazepam as 
prescribed/recommended by treating MD 
2. Follow-up with regular psychiatrist in one week 
3. Return to the ER if/as needed.  
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Homicide Risk Assessment Practice Survey 
--- Case Background --- 
A patient presented to a hospital emergency room with a chief complaint of homicidal ideation. 
He was released with directions to follow-up with his outpatient psychiatrist.  
 
--- Case Outcome --- 
Two days after the psychologist in the emergency room assessed him, the patient shot his ex-
wife and friend. 
 
Below is a reproduction of the hospital chart with the note that the evaluating psychologist 
wrote after assessing the patient. Please review the case and answer the questions that follow the 
case. 
BEGINNING OF HOSPITAL ER CONTACT SUMMARY 
 
--- Chief Complaint --- 
“I’m feeling worse.” “I’m having homicidal thoughts of killing my ex-wife and friend.”  
 
--- History of Present Illness --- 
Mr. Davis is a 34-year-old Caucasian man who arrived alone at the ER at 10:30PM. He reported 
feeling depressed for the last three months but “started getting worse” in the last week. He has 
been having thoughts about “shoot and kill his ex-wife and friend.” He reported that recently 
she has taken their young child and left him. He reported he was convinced she left him for his 
friend and that she had been “sleeping around” prior to their divorce. He has felt slowed down, 
has had difficulty concentrating, and has lost ten pounds over the last three months. He took a 
few days off of work last week because he “can’t get out of bed in the morning.”   
 
He first saw a psychiatrist ten days ago, and he was prescribed Zoloft 50mg. Mr. Davis says he 
has been taking the medicine regularly. He said he has been feeling more anxious and having 
more difficulty sleeping than before taking Zoloft and “thought about stopping it.” He said he 
attempted to contact his psychiatrist, but since it is the weekend, he has been unable to contact 
her at her office number. 
--- Mental Health History --- 
He reported thinking about homicide on one prior occasion at the age of 25 after a breakup with 
a girlfriend, but he did not make an attempt. Has never sought treatment for depression until ten 
days ago.  He drinks “two glasses of wine at dinner once a week.” He denied illicit drug use. 
 
--- Medical History --- 
No major medical conditions.  
 
--- Psychosocial History --- 
Employed as a salesman. Divorced 6 months ago. Has a 3-year-old son who lives with his ex-
wife in a neighboring state. Not currently in a relationship. Has family in the city and is close 
with one brother who lives in the city. Has few friends from work with whom he usually 
socializes, but not lately.  
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--- Family History --- 
Father is an “alcoholic” 
Sister takes Paxil for “stress” 
No family history of suicides or psychiatric hospitalizations 
 
--- History of Violence --- 
Mr. Davis has no known history of violence.  
 
--- Mental Status Exam --- 
Appearance- looks like he hasn't saved in several days 
Behavior- mild psychomotor agitation (fidget, can’t sit still) 
Mood- “depressed,” “nervous” 
Affect- congruent with self-report 
Speech- slow rate 
Thought process- linear 
Thought content- (+) homicidal ideation, and thoughts of “killing my ex-wife and friend.” He 
said, “I would never do it because I want her to be here for my son” 
No suicidal ideation 
No delusions were endorsed 
Perceptions- no auditory or visual hallucinations 
Cognition- no objective impairment 
Insight- good (he knows he is depressed and seeks treatment) 
 
--- Additional Information --- 
I was able to contact Mr. Davis’ current psychiatrist. She said that Mr. Davis was scheduled for 
another appointment in three weeks; but that she has an opening in her schedule and he could 
come to her office in one week for an earlier appointment if needed. She indicated she would 
write and call in a prescription for Clonazepam 0.5mg po bid, 30 pills, no refill for symptoms 
potentially resulting from Zoloft side effects.  
 
--- Assessment --- 
1. Major Depression, recurrent, moderate severity 
2. Adjustment issues (divorce) 
3. Increased anxiety/insomnia since starting Zoloft is likely an early side-effect of Zoloft, per 
treating MD 
4. Although Mr. Davis was initially interested in hospitalization, when I explained that his 
anxiety was likely a side-effect of Zoloft that could improve with time and a brief course of 
an additional medication, he endorsed feeling hopeful and said he would rather go home. 
 
--- Plan --- 
1. Pt indicated he would continue to take anti-depressant medication as prescribed, and he 
would immediately pick up and start taking Clonazepam as prescribed/recommended by 
treating MD 
2. Follow-up with regular psychiatrist in one week 
3. Return to the ER if/as needed.  
END OF HOSPITAL CHART 
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Suicide Risk Assessment Practice Survey 
 
--- Case Background --- 
A patient presented to a hospital emergency room with a chief complaint of suicidal 
ideation. He was released with directions to follow-up with his outpatient psychiatrist.  
 
Below is a reproduction of the hospital chart with the note that the evaluating 
psychologist wrote after assessing the patient. Please review the case and answer the 
questions that follow the case. 
 
BEGINNING OF HOSPITAL ER CONTACT SUMMARY 
 
--- Chief Complaint --- 
“I’m feeling worse.” “I’m having suicidal thoughts.” 
 
--- History of Present Illness --- 
Mr. Davis is a 34-year-old Caucasian man who arrived alone at the ER at 10:30PM. He 
reported feeling depressed for the last three months but “started getting worse” in the last 
week. He has been having thoughts about “shooting himself in the head to end it all.” He 
has felt slowed down, has had difficulty concentrating, and has lost ten pounds over the 
last three months. He took a few days off of work last week because he “can’t get out of 
bed in the morning.”   
 
He first saw a psychiatrist ten days ago, and he was prescribed Zoloft 50mg. Mr. Davis 
says he has been taking the medicine regularly. He said he has been feeling more anxious 
and having more difficulty sleeping than before taking Zoloft and “thought about 
stopping it.” He said he attempted to contact his psychiatrist, but since it is the weekend, 
he has been unable to contact her at her office number. 
 
--- Mental Health History --- 
He reported thinking about suicide on one prior occasion at the age of 25 after a breakup 
with a girlfriend, but he did not make an attempt. Has never sought treatment for 
depression until ten days ago.  He drinks “two glasses of wine at dinner once a week.” He 
denied illicit drug use. 
 
--- Medical History --- 
No major medical conditions.  
 
--- Psychosocial History --- 
Employed as a salesman. Divorced 6 months ago. Has a 3-year-old son who lives with 
his ex-wife in a neighboring state. Not currently in a relationship. Has family in the city 
and is close with one brother who lives in the city. Has few friends from work with whom 
he usually socializes, but not lately.  
 
--- Family History --- 
Father is an “alcoholic” 
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Sister takes Paxil for “stress” 
No family history of suicides or psychiatric hospitalization. 
 
--- Mental Status Exam --- 
Appearance- looks like he has not shaved in several days 
Behavior- mild psychomotor agitation (fidget, can’t sit still) 
Mood- “depressed,” “nervous” 
Affect- congruent with self-report 
Speech- slow rate 
Thought process- linear 
Thought content- (+) suicidal ideation, and thoughts of “shooting myself in the head.” He 
said, “I would never do it because I want to be here for my son” 
No homicidal ideation 
No delusions were endorsed 
Perceptions- no auditory or visual hallucinations 
Cognition- no objective impairment 
Insight- good (he knows he is depressed and seeks treatment) 
 
--- Additional Information --- 
I was able to contact Mr. Davis’ current psychiatrist. She said that Mr. Davis was 
scheduled for another appointment in three weeks; but that she has an opening in her 
schedule and he could come to her office in one week for an earlier appointment if 
needed. She indicated she would write and call in a prescription for Clonazepam 0.5mg 
po bid, 30 pills, no refill for symptoms potentially resulting from Zoloft side effects.  
 
--- Assessment --- 
1. Major Depression, recurrent, moderate severity 
2. Adjustment issues (divorce) 
3. Increased anxiety/insomnia since starting Zoloft is likely an early side-effect of 
Zoloft, per treating MD 
4. Although Mr. Davis was initially interested in hospitalization, when I explained 
that his anxiety was likely a side-effect of Zoloft that could improve with time and 
a brief course of an additional medication, he endorsed feeling hopeful and said 
he would rather go home. 
--- Plan --- 
1. Pt indicated he would continue to take anti-depressant medication as prescribed, 
and he would immediately pick up and start taking Clonazepam as 
prescribed/recommended by treating MD 
2. Follow-up with regular psychiatrist in one week 
3. Return to the ER if/as needed.  
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Suicide Risk Assessment Practice Survey 
 
--- Case Background --- 
A patient presented to a hospital emergency room with a chief complaint of suicidal ideation. 
He was  released with directions to follow-up with his outpatient psychiatrist.  
 
--- Case Outcome --- 
Two days after the psychologist in the emergency room assessed him, the patient committed 
suicide by shooting himself with a gun. 
 
 
Below is a reproduction of the hospital chart with the note that the evaluating psychologist 
wrote after assessing the patient. Please review the case and answer the questions that follow the 
case. 
 
BEGINNING OF HOSPITAL ER CONTACT SUMMARY 
 
--- Chief Complaint --- 
“I’m feeling worse.” “I’m having suicidal thoughts.” 
 
--- History of Present Illness --- 
Mr. Davis is a 34-year-old Caucasian man who arrived alone at the ER at 10:30PM. He reported 
feeling depressed for the last three months but “started getting worse” in the last week. He has 
been having thoughts about “shooting himself in the head to end it all.” He has felt slowed 
down, has had difficulty concentrating, and has lost ten pounds over the last three months. He 
took a few days off of work last week because he “can’t get out of bed in the morning.”   
 
He first saw a psychiatrist ten days ago, and he was prescribed Zoloft 50mg. Mr. Davis says he 
has been taking the medicine regularly. He said he has been feeling more anxious and having 
more difficulty sleeping than before taking Zoloft and “thought about stopping it.” He said he 
attempted to contact his psychiatrist, but since it is the weekend, he has been unable to contact 
her at her office number. 
 
--- Mental Health History --- 
He reported thinking about suicide on one prior occasion at the age of 25 after a breakup with a 
girlfriend, but he did not make an attempt. Has never sought treatment for depression until ten 
days ago.  He drinks “two glasses of wine at dinner once a week.” He denied illicit drug use. 
 
--- Medical History --- 
No major medical conditions. 
 
--- Psychosocial History --- 
Employed as a salesman. Divorced 6 months ago. Has a 3-year-old son who lives with his ex-
wife in a neighboring state. Not currently in a relationship. Has family in the city and is close 
with one brother who lives in the city. Has few friends from work with whom he usually 
socializes, but not lately.  
HINDSIGHT BIAS IN CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
   
41 
 
--- Family History --- 
Father is an “alcoholic” 
Sister takes Paxil for “stress” 
No family history of suicides or psychiatric hospitalizations 
 
--- Mental Status Exam --- 
Appearance- looks like he has not shaved in several days 
Behavior- mild psychomotor agitation (fidget, can’t sit still) 
Mood- “depressed,” “nervous” 
Affect- congruent with self-report 
Speech- slow rate 
Thought process- linear 
Thought content- (+) suicidal ideation, and thoughts of “shooting myself in the head.” He said, 
“I would never do it because I want to be here for my son” 
No homicidal ideation 
No delusions were endorsed 
Perceptions- no auditory or visual hallucinations 
Cognition- no objective impairment 
Insight- good (he knows he is depressed and seeks treatment) 
 
--- Additional Information --- 
I was able to contact Mr. Davis’ current psychiatrist. She said that Mr. Davis was scheduled for 
another appointment in three weeks; but that she has an opening in her schedule and he could 
come to her office in one week for an earlier appointment if needed. She indicated she would 
write and call in a prescription for Clonazepam 0.5mg po bid, 30 pills, no refill for symptoms 
potentially resulting from Zoloft side effects.  
 
--- Assessment --- 
1. Major Depression, recurrent, moderate severity 
2. Adjustment issues (divorce) 
3. Increased anxiety/insomnia since starting Zoloft is likely an early side-effect of Zoloft, per 
treating MD 
4. Although Mr. Davis was initially interested in hospitalization, when I explained that his 
anxiety was likely a side-effect of Zoloft that could improve with time and a brief course of 
an additional medication, he endorsed feeling hopeful and said he would rather go home. 
 
--- Plan --- 
1. Pt indicated he would continue to take anti-depressant medication as prescribed, and he 
would immediately pick up and start taking Clonazepam as prescribed/recommended by 
treating MD 
2. Follow-up with regular psychiatrist in one week 
3. Return to the ER if/as needed. 
 
END OF HOSPITAL CHART 
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Appendix C: Questionnaires 
 
In this case, did the psychologist have a duty to assess the patient’s likelihood of 
committing suicide?    ____ yes ____ no 
 
Please classify the patient in terms of suicide-risk at the time he was released from the 
hospital. 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7  
     Low Risk                   Moderate Risk            High Risk   
 
Given the information presented in the case material, what would you have predicted the 
outcome of this incident was likely to be? 
___ Patient would commit suicide  ___ Patient would not commit suicide   
 




Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statement: 
The psychologist should have done more to ensure violence did not occur. 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7  
    Strongly        Moderately               Strongly 
       Disagree        Agree          Agree 
 
How would you rate the psychologist’s overall assessment? 
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
          Not                       Moderately                       Very 
       Negligent             Negligent       Negligent 
 
If you had to make a final decision about the negligence of this psychologist, what would 
you decide? 
___ this psychologist was not negligent in performing his/her professional duty 
___ this psychologist was negligent in performing his/her professional duty  
 
Below is a list of actions, which psychologists may try; the psychologist already may 
have used some of the actions below in this case. Please check any additional or 
alternative actions you think this psychologist should have taken: 
___ sought independent evaluation from another professional 
___ ordered psychological tests 
___ notified the patient’s family or friends 
___ informed the police 
___ recommended or initiated voluntary hospitalization   
___ recommended or initiated involuntary hospitalization  
___ initiated, increased, or altered medication for the patient 
___ decline or terminated treatment 
___ other (please explain) _______________________________’ 
Table 1 
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Demographic Information for Sub-samples  
 








N (%) 95 37 (39%) 43 (45%) 15 (16%) 
     
Gender Male 34 (36%) 11 (30%) 13 (30%) 10 (66%) 
Female 61 (64%) 26 (70%) 30 (70%) 5 (33%) 
      
Age M (SD)   41.37 (14.12) 38.11 (11.88) 39.79 (14.11) 33.00 (8.64) 
     
 USA 72 (76%) 32 (87%) 26 (60%) 14 (93.3%) 
Country Canada 6 (6%) 1 (2.7%) 3 (7%) 1 (6.7%) 
 Australia 6 (6%) 1 (2.7%) 5 (11.6%) 0 
 Other 12 (13%) 3 (8.1%) 1 (2.3%) 0 
      
Highest 
Degree 
PhD 28 (30%) 10 (27%) 8 (18.6%) 10 (66.7%) 
PsyD 16 (17%) 9 (24.3%) 4 (9.3%) 3 (20%) 
MD 3 (3%) 1 (2.7%) 2 (4.7%) 0  
MA/MSW 30 (32%) 4 (19%) 8 (18.6%) 0 
Other/Missing 25 (26%) 8 (27%) 7 (16%) 1 (6.7%) 
      
Years in 
Profession 
M (SD) 13.00 (11.26) 10.09 (10.31) 12.74 (10.97) 16.80 (11.69) 






M (SD) 8.58 (9.82) 
 
8.80 (7.18) 6.44 (8.91) 10.61 (10.06)  
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Demographic Information for Experimental Groups 
 










N (%) 95 21 (22%) 25 (26%) 26 (27%) 23 (24%) 
      
Gender Male 34 (36%) 7 (33%) 6 (24%) 14 (54%) 7 (30%) 
Female 61 (64%) 14 (66%) 19 (76%) 12 (46%) 16 (70%) 
       
Age M (SD)   41.37 (14.12) 40.19 (14.49) 43.04 (15.05) 33.00(8.64) 45.61 (13.10) 
      
 USA 72 (76%) 18 (86%) 15 (60%) 22 (85%) 17 (74%) 
Country Canada 6 (6%) 0 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 3 (13%) 
 Australia 6 (6%) 2 (10%) 4 (16%) 0 0 
 Other 12 (13%) 1 (4%) 5 (20%) 3 (7 %) 3 (13%) 
       
Highest 
Degree 
PhD 28 (30%) 6 (29%) 5 (20%) 7 (27%) 10 (44%) 
PsyD 16 (17%) 4 (19%) 3 (12%) 5 (19%) 4 (17%) 
MD 3 (3%) 1 (5%) 0 2 (8 %) 0 
MA/MSW 30 (32%) 4 (19%) 7 (28%) 10 (40%) 9 (13%) 
Other/Missing 25 (26%) 6 (28%) 10 (40%) 3 (6%) 6 (26%) 
       
Years in 
Profession 
M (SD) 13.00 (11.26) 10.58 (12.02) 15.20 (11.34) 8.75 (9.66) 12.58 (11.43) 





M (SD) 8.58 (9.82) 
 
7.79 (9.21) 9.33 (11.08) 4.37 (4.71) * 12.57 (11.42) * 
Range 0 - 37 0 - 35 0 - 34 0 - 18 0 - 37 
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Figure 2.  Mean Negligence Rating for outcome versus no outcome based on case type. 
 
